Sign In

Chapter 5: Sabotage

Section 27: General Requirements Against Sabotage

103. Notwithstanding the requirement prescribed in Chapter 4, the physical protection system of a nu-clear facility should be integrated and effective against both sabotage and unauthorized removal.

104. The licensee shall conduct an analysis for each nuclear facility for NRRC's approval to determine whether the radioactive inventory has the potential to result in unacceptable radiological conse-quences, assuming that the sabotage acts will be successfully completed while ignoring the impact of the physical protection or mitigation measures.

105. The licensee shall set and implement a set of physical protection design objectives and/or measures for each assigned level of protection as prescribed by the NRRC, based on the results of analyses in Article 104.

106. The licensee of a nuclear facility whose radiological consequences do not exceed the threshold limit established by NRRC shall protect the equipment, systems, devices, and nuclear material against the sabotage based on a graded approach and per requirements provided by NRRC.

107. The licensee of a nuclear facility whose radiological consequences exceed the threshold limit es-tablished by NRRC shall identify equipment, systems or devices, or nuclear material that could di-rectly or indirectly become a potential sabotage target and protect them in accordance with the design process and protection requirements as prescribed by the NRRC.

108. The licensee shall assess, on detection of a malicious act, whether this act could lead to radiologi-cal consequences and notify the NRRC.

109. The licensee shall take measures specified in the contingency plan Immediately following an act of sabotage to prevent further damage, secure the nuclear facility, and protect emergency equip-ment and personnel.

Section 28: Designing a Physical Protection System Against Sabotage

110. The licensee shall define credible sabotage scenarios against the nuclear facility and nuclear ma-terial based on the design basis threat, including, but not limited to stand-off attacks, in-siders, collusion of adversary and cyber threats.

111. The licensee shall design a physical protection system that is effective against the sabotage sce-narios taking into account other systems of the facility.

112. The physical protection system shall be designed to deny unauthorized access of persons or equipment to the targets, to minimize the opportunity of insiders, and to protect the targets against possible stand-off attacks consistent with design basis threat.

113. The licensee shall ensure the effectiveness of nuclear security measures against the sabotage sce-narios and make required improvement modifications based on the results of performed tests which shall be subject to the NRRC approval. 

Section 29: Requirements Against Sabotage at Nuclear Facilities 

114. All equipment, systems or devices, or nuclear material, the sabotage of which could directly or in-directly lead to high radiological consequences shall be located inside one or more vital areas.

115. The licensee shall meet the requirements of Section 27 of this regulation along with the following additional requirements:

(a) Timely detection of tampering or interference with vital area equipment, systems or de-vices shall be provided.

(b) Maintaining strict access control to vital areas during a shutdown and maintenance peri-od. 

(c) Conducting searches and testing to detect any tampering that may have been committed during shutdown and maintenance.

116. For nuclear material and other nuclear facilities other than nuclear power plants, sabotage of which can result in radiological consequences to the public shall be protected depending on the degree of consequences.​

By continuing to use our website, you acknowledge the use of cookies Privacy Policy